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UNITED STATES v. FORRESTER: AN
UNWARRANTED NARROWING OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Schuyler B. Sorosky*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Framers lived in a world where web pages, browsers, and
hyperlinks were unimaginable. Before the advent of telephones,
computers, or even postage stamps, eighteenth-century America was
a land of primitive technology and finite modes of communication.
When the Framers drafted the Constitution and, specifically, the
Fourth Amendment, they never envisaged our modem-day world of
cyberspace.
Today, the Internet has become a primary means of
communication and an indispensable tool for gathering information
and exchanging ideas. As such, the so-called "online revolution" has
generated several questions regarding Fourth Amendment searches
and seizures that the Framers never anticipated. One much-debated
issue involves the extent to which the government can probe into
one's online activity, including web searches and electronic mail
communications, consistent with the Fourth Amendment.1
The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to bar unreasonable
government searches and seizures so as to safeguard individuals'
privacy interests.2 This right "to be let alone" is a well-established
tenet of American society.3 However, in today's digital world, where
* J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, University
of California, Berkeley. Special thanks to Professor Marcy Strauss and the editors of the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review for their suggestions. Most importantly, I would like to thank my
family for all of their love and support.
1. See In re United States for Orders Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers, 515 F. Supp. 2d
325, 337-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (coining the phrase "expectation of
privacy"); see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
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individuals can communicate with the mere click of a mouse and
surveillance techniques have reached an unprecedented level, "there
exists a fear that new technologies are eroding Fourth Amendment
protections."4  It is in this context that courts are faced with
determining the appropriate application of the Fourth Amendment to
the realm of cyberspace.
In United States v. Forrester,5 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
issue of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search in the context
of the Internet.6 In Forrester, the court held, as a matter of first
impression, that the use of computer surveillance techniques did not
amount to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.7
Specifically, the court held that surveillance techniques that enabled
the government to discern the to/from addresses of a defendant's e-
mail messages, the Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses of the websites
the defendant visited, and the total volume of data transmitted to and
from the defendant's account, were constitutionally sound
investigative measures.8 By this ruling, the Ninth Circuit improperly
sanctioned an unwarranted narrowing of Fourth Amendment
protections guaranteed by the Constitution.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that
these computer surveillance techniques do not trigger the protections
of the Fourth Amendment. Part II presents a brief background of the
factual and procedural history of Forrester. Part III provides the
historical framework leading up to the case, including a discussion of
the reasonable expectation standard the U.S. Supreme Court has
REV. 193, 195-96 (1890) (footnote omitted) (discussing in depth the privacy interests enjoyed by
individuals).
4. Ric Simmons, Technological Change and the Evolution of Criminal Law: Why 2007 is
Not Like 1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology's Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 533 (2007) (discussing the effect of
technological advances on Fourth Amendment cases and arguing for an appropriate balance
between an individual's right to privacy and the government's interest in law enforcement); see
Meir S. Hornung, Note, Think Before You Type: A Look at Email Privacy in the Workplace, 11
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 115, 118 (2005) (discussing privacy interests regarding e-mail
communications in the workplace).
5. 495 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g denied, 2008 WL 60506 (Jan. 7, 2008).
6. Forrester, 495 F.3d. at 1043.
7. Id. at 1048.
8. Id. at 1048-49. It is important to note that while I challenge the court's ultimate holding
in Forrester, I agree with the court's ruling that surveillance techniques that enable the
government to learn the volume of data transmitted to and from a defendant's account are
constitutionally sound.
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developed to address Fourth Amendment issues. Part IV discusses
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning leading to its determination that the
government's computer surveillance techniques did not amount to a
Fourth Amendment search. Part V analyzes the errors the court
made in its application of the reasonable expectation standard to the
government's surveillance techniques in Forrester. Specifically, this
section argues that the Ninth Circuit erroneously analogized the
government's computer surveillance techniques to the use of a pen
register and to surveillance of physical mail.9 Part VI examines the
implications this decision might have on future cases, focusing on
the narrower role the Fourth Amendment might play in a modern
technological world. Lastly, this Comment concludes that the Fourth
Amendment should protect individuals' privacy interests in online
activity and that courts should create new standards for judging
Fourth Amendment claims involving Internet searches and electronic
communications.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In May 2001, the government began computer surveillance to
investigate defendants Mark Forrester and Dennis Alba for allegedly
manufacturing ecstasy. 10 The government installed a "mirror port"
on Alba's account with PacBell Internet, which allowed the
government to monitor Alba's internet activity."1 Specifically, the
mirror port "enabled the government to learn the to/from addresses
of Alba's e-mail messages, the IP addresses of the websites that Alba
visited and the total volume of information sent to or from his
account.'
12
Both defendants were charged and convicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California of
conspiracy to manufacture ecstasy and other offenses concerning
defendants' operation of an ecstasy-manufacturing plant. 3 After the
jury trial, the district court sentenced each defendant to 360 months
9. Id. at 1049-50.
10. Id. at 1044.
ll. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1043.
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in prison, and the defendants each appealed their convictions. 4 On
appeal, Alba contended that the government's computer surveillance
techniques were unlawful.'5 Particularly, Alba argued that the
government's investigation of his electronic mail communications
and other internet activity infringed upon his privacy rights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 6
The Ninth Circuit denied Alba's contentions. 7 The court held,
as a matter of first impression, 8 that the use of such computer
surveillance techniques does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 9 The court reasoned that the government's computer
surveillance techniques were "analogous to the use of a pen register
that the Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland did not constitute
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes."2 °  The court also
reasoned that the government's surveillance of the to/from addresses
of e-mail messages and the IP addresses of websites visited is
indistinguishable from government surveillance of physical mail and,
accordingly, is likewise undeserving of Fourth Amendment
protection.2'
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
In 1791, the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment to ensure
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures .... ."" As
such, this provision creates constitutional protection from arbitrary
14. Id. at 1045. Forrester's conviction was reversed on appeal due to a Sixth Amendment
violation, as the court found that Forrester's waiver of his right to counsel was not knowing or
intelligent. Id. at 1047.
15. Id. at 1043.
16. Id. at 1048-50.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1048 ("Neither this nor any other circuit has spoken to the constitutionality of
computer surveillance techniques that reveal the to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP
addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or from an account.").
19. Id. at 1050.
20. Id. at 1043 (citation omitted) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). "A pen
register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the
electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It does not overhear oral
communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed." United States v.
N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.l (1977).
21. Id. at 1049.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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government probing and intrusions.23  Particularly, the Fourth
Amendment secures individuals' privacy interests in their
possessions from government invasion.
A. Katz
In Katz v. United States,24 the Supreme Court rejected the theory
that the Fourth Amendment only applies to physical intrusions.25 In
this landmark decision, the Court acknowledged that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places. 26 In Katz, the government
listened to and recorded the defendant's telephone conversation in a
telephone booth.27 The Supreme Court held that such monitoring
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that the
government's acts "violated the privacy upon which [the defendant]
justifiably relied ....
In addition to expanding Fourth Amendment protection beyond
physical invasions, Katz laid the foundation for determining what
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.29  In his
concurrence, Justice Harlan set forth a two-prong test to determine
whether government action qualifies as a search. According to
Justice Harlan, a search requires "first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable."' 3 ' Under this rubric, the key to determining whether
government action constitutes a search is whether the individual had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject of the
investigation.
23. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1, 3 (2006) (defining a Fourth Amendment search as "any
intrusion with the purpose of obtaining physical evidence or information, either by a
technological device or the use of the senses into a protected interest").
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 353.
27. Id. at 348.
28. Id. at 353.
29. Id. at 361.
30. Id.
31. Id.
Spring 2008] 1125
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B. Smith
In Smith v. Maryland,32 the Supreme Court applied the Katz two-
part inquiry to determine whether the government's actions
constituted a search.33 In doing so, the Court concluded that the use
of a pen register to record dialed telephone numbers did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 4 In applying Katz,
the Court announced that "the application of the Fourth Amendment
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a
'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'
that has been invaded by government action."35
In Smith, the Court concluded that the defendant did not have
the requisite expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed to
sustain a Fourth Amendment claim.36 The Court reasoned that
people do not have a subjective expectation of privacy in numbers
they dial because people "realize that they must 'convey' phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone
company switching equipment that their calls are completed."37 The
Court emphasized that telephone users generally understand that they
convey phone numbers to telephone companies and that, in turn, the
companies have the capacity to record such numerical information
for business purposes.38 According to the Court, people have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information "voluntarily
turn[ed] over to third parties"39 and, as such, an expectation of
privacy in dialed phone numbers is not one society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Taken literally, Smith stands for the
proposition that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information
accessible to a third party.
32. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
33. Id. at 740 (explaining that Harlan's two-part inquiry is used to determine whether the
government invaded an individual's privacy interests).
34. Id. at 745-46.
35. Id. at 740.
36. Id. at 745.
37. Id. at 742.
38. Id. at 743.
39. Id. at 744. 1 will refer to this concept throughout this Comment as the "third party
argument" or the "third party doctrine."
40. Id. at 743.
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IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that the
government's computer surveillance techniques did not constitute a
Fourth Amendment search because the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of his e-
mail messages or in the IP addresses of websites he visited.4' In
reaching its decision, the court analogized the government's
computer surveillance practices to other types of surveillance
techniques that the Supreme Court has held do not infringe upon
privacy interests.42  First, the Ninth Circuit analogized the
government's computer surveillance techniques to the use of a pen
register, which the Supreme Court held in Smith is a constitutionally
permissible investigative device.43 Second, the court analogized the
government's surveillance of e-mail addresses to government
surveillance of physical mail.'
A. The Court's Analogy to the Use of Pen Registers in Smith
1. Diminished Expectation of Privacy in Information
Turned Over to Third Parties
Although the Supreme Court's 1979 Smith decision predates the
internet revolution, the Ninth Circuit relied on Smith in reaching its
decision in Forrester. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit determined that
the computer surveillance techniques used by the government are
"constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register that
the Court approved in Smith."45 The court reasoned that "e-mail and
Internet users, like the telephone users in Smith, rely on third-party
equipment in order to engage in communication." '46 The court
emphasized that just as the telephone users in Smith had no
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dialed due to their
"imputed knowledge" that their calls are completed through third-
party telephone company equipment,47 internet users likewise have
41. 495 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2007).
42. Id. at 1049.
43. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46; Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049.
44. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their e-mail
communications or the IP addresses of websites they search "because
they should know that these messages are sent and these IP addresses
are accessed through the equipment of their Internet service provider
and other third parties."48  The court asserted that both
communication by Internet and communication by telephone require
turning information over to third parties.49
2 Surveillance Did Not Reveal the Underlying Content
of the Communications
The Ninth Circuit also analogized the use of computer
surveillance techniques in Forrester to the use of a pen register in
Smith, finding that neither mode of surveillance reveals any
underlying content of the communication involved.5" The Smith
court reasoned that pen registers do not violate any reasonable
expectation of privacy because they do not acquire the actual content
of the telephone conversation at issue.5' Instead, pen registers merely
obtain the telephone number associated with a particular call, without
revealing anything more about the communication itself.2
In Forrester, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that computer
surveillance is indistinguishable from the use of a pen register
because "e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses constitute
addressing information and reveal no more about the underlying
contents of communication than do phone numbers."53 The court
explained that when the government determines the telephone
numbers an individual has dialed, it may learn the identity of the
parties to which the numbers correspond, but it may not uncover the
actual content of the conversations. 4 Likewise, the court noted that
"when the government obtains the to/from addresses of a person's e-
mails or the IP addresses of websites visited, it does not find out the
contents of the messages or the particular pages on the websites the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979).
52. Id. at 741.
53. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049.
54. Id.
1128
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person viewed."55  According to the court, the government can
merely speculate about the contents of the underlying
communication in either situation:
56
At best, the government may make educated guesses
about what was said in the messages or viewed on the
websites based on its knowledge of the e-mail to/from
addresses and IP addresses-but this is no different
from speculation about the contents of a phone
conversation on the basis of the identity of the person
or entity that was dialed. 7
Thus, the court determined that, like the pen register, the computer
surveillance techniques at issue were constitutionally sound and did
not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment. 8
B. The Court's Analogy to Physical Mail
In Forrester, the Ninth Circuit also analogized e-mail
communications to physical mail. 9 In drawing this comparison, the
court noted: "In a line of cases dating back to the nineteenth century,
the Supreme Court has held that the government cannot engage in a
warrantless search of the contents of sealed mail, but can observe
whatever information people put on the outside of mail, because that
information is voluntarily transmitted to third parties. ' 6' The court
reasoned that "[e]-mail, like physical mail, has an outside address
'visible' to the third-party carriers that transmit it to its intended
location, and also a package of content that the sender presumes will
be read only by the intended recipient."'" Accordingly, the court
concluded that "[t]he privacy interests in these two forms of
communication are identical" because "[t]he contents may deserve
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1050.
59. Id. at 1049-50.
60. Id. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970) (holding that postal
service authorities can detain mail if the package appears suspicious); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
727, 733 (1877) (noting that the content on the outside of mail is not protected from inspection);
United States v. Hemandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that one has no
reasonable expectation that postal service workers will not view the exterior of mail).
61. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1050.
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Fourth Amendment protection, but the address and size of the
package do not.
6 2
V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit should have characterized the government's
computer surveillance techniques in Forrester as a search under the
Fourth Amendment. In analogizing the government's surveillance
methods to the use of a pen register and comparing electronic
communications to physical mail, the court inaccurately determined
that internet users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their online activity. This error exposes the court's misunderstanding
of the nature of the Internet and could lead to an improper narrowing
of Fourth Amendment protections as applied to modern
communication methods.
A. The Court's Erroneous Analogy to the Use of Pen
Registers in Smith
The Ninth Circuit erred in analogizing the government's use of
computer surveillance techniques in Forrester to the use of a pen
register in Smith. First, the court mistakenly analogized
communication by Internet to communication by telephone in that
both modes of communication involve information voluntarily
turned over to third parties.63 Unlike a pen register, the computer
surveillance techniques employed by the government in Forrester
encroached upon the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy,
notwithstanding the presence of a third party internet service
provider. While telephone users may not have an expectation of
privacy in the telephone numbers they dial, internet users indubitably
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the e-mail addresses of
parties with whom they communicate and in the IP addresses of the
websites they visit. Further, courts should not apply Smith's third-
party doctrine when people have no viable choice but to reveal
information to a third party.
Second, the court incorrectly reasoned that the computer
surveillance techniques in Forrester, like the pen register in Smith,
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1049.
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did not reveal any content of the actual communications involved.'
Unlike straightforward telephone numbers, IP addresses do, in fact,
convey content beyond the mere numbers displayed. This Comment
discusses some examples of such exposed content in further detail in
Part V.A.2.
1. Individuals Have a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Online
Communications, Even if Turned over to Third Parties
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied Smith's third-party
argument to online communications. The court's reasoning is flawed
because the court neglected to recognize that people have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their online communications and
web searches, regardless of the fact that internet service providers
have the potential to monitor such activity. Instinctively, internet
users presume their web communications are private and, therefore,
do not anticipate that clandestine government agents or internet
service providers will tap into their personal online ventures. The
mere possibility that a third party with the requisite expertise can
learn information pertaining to an internet user's web activity does
not eliminate an expectation of privacy.65
a. The Court's Misunderstanding
First, the court's analogy is unfounded because the nature of the
Internet is fundamentally different from the third-party telephone
switching equipment in Smith, due in part to the "non-intuitive
manner by which e-mails 'travel."' 66  Unlike other modes of
communication, "e-mails are not relayed from station to station
completely intact"67 as, for example, a dialed telephone number
would be. Rather, all information transmitted over the Internet is
broken down into individual parts that are subsequently transmitted
64. Id.
65. See Casey Holland, Note, Neither Big Brother Nor Dead Brother: The Need for a New
Fourth Amendment Standard Applying to Emerging Technologies, 94 KY. L.J. 393, 408-09
(2005-06) (arguing that people still have expectations of privacy in electronic communications
despite the ability of certain persons with the requisite technical expertise to view them).
66. Jim W. Ko, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Wiretap Act Fail to Protect
Against Random ISP Monitoring of E-Mails for the Purpose ofAssisting Law Enforcement, 22 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 507 (2004) (arguing that both the Fourth Amendment
and the Wiretap Act provide poor defenses against the unprecedented threat to privacy in the
Computer Age).
67. Id.
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individually through various paths.68 As such, one could conclude
that "a reasonable expectation of privacy does exist for e-mail
transmissions as to the relay stations, because an individual relay
station only receives fragments of any given e-mail, and the only
feasible locations from which a particular message can be intercepted
are the sender's and recipient's host computers."69 Accordingly, as
Professor Ric Simmons points out, application of Smith's third-party
argument to the realm of cyberspace "would give the government the
power to monitor every piece of electronic mail that is sent through
the internet, since every electronic transmission that is sent from one
person to another travels through numerous switching computers,
each of which are independent third parties and any of which have
the capability of recording the addresses and the content of the
transmissions.
70
Second, the court fails to recognize that individuals have a
greater expectation of privacy in their online activity than in the
telephone numbers they dial because unlike telephone numbers,
neither e-mail addresses nor IP addresses of websites visited are
displayed on monthly internet bills. As such, internet users have no
reason to believe that internet service providers actually monitor
online activity or maintain records of such activity in the ordinary
course of business. In fact, at least one district court has recognized
that individuals have a greater expectation of privacy in information
that does not appear on monthly bills.71 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York rejected the theory that
the presence of third-party intermediaries with potential access to
information negates a reasonable expectation of privacy,
68. Id.
69. Id.; see also Holland, supra note 65, at 410 ("E-mails are not like telephone calls which
are terminated if the recipient does not respond. Unless an e-mail recipient's computer is on and
actively receiving packets at the time the e-mail arrives, it must necessarily be placed in
electronic storage on some third party's system.").
70. Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to
Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1339 (2002) (arguing that courts
should apply the Katz test as it was originally intended by only considering the result of the
search, rather than the method).
71. In re United States for Orders Authorizing the Use of Pen Registers, 515 F. Supp. 2d
325, 337-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (determining that the use of a pen register to collect information
regarding post-cut-through dialed digits-numbers dialed after a call goes through-infringes
upon privacy interests, reasoning in part that such information is not kept in the ordinary course
of business and does not appear on monthly bills).
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acknowledging that changes "in technology [do] not alter the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment.
712
Further, the use of password protections shows that internet
users have an expectation of privacy in their online and e-mail
activity.73 Most individuals implement password devices requiring
the entry of a password before logging onto one's computer.
Passwords are also universally used when accessing one's e-mail
account. While passwords are usually required when accessing
computers and e-mail accounts, passwords are usually not required
when using other modes of communication-namely, the telephone.
Hence, the widespread use of passwords indicates that internet users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their online activity since
through such passwords, individuals restrict public access to
information on their computer and in their email accounts.74 As a
result, internet users do not anticipate that anyone will gain access to
their specific online endeavors.
b. Courts Should Not Apply Smith's Third-Party
Argument to the Internet
Further, courts should decline to apply Smith's third-party
argument when individuals have no viable choice but to reveal
information to a third party. In that regard, the Forrester court's
analysis is flawed because it underestimates the fundamental role the
Internet plays in contemporary society.75 In Katz, the Supreme Court
noted that the communications at issue were guaranteed Fourth
Amendment protection because "[t]o read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come
to play in private communication."76
72. Id. at 339.
73. See Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and
Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REv. 1181, 1200 (1995) ("Reliance on protections such as individual
computer accounts, password protection, and perhaps encryption of data should be no less
reasonable than reliance upon locks, bolts, and burglar alarms, even though each form of
protection is penetrable.").
74. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing that the use of
password protections may indicate an expectation of privacy).
75. See Jayni Foley, Note, Are Google Searches Private? An Originalist Interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment in Online Communication Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 447, 465
(2007) (analyzing privacy protections for Internet searches).
76. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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Likewise, in his dissent in Smith, Justice Marshall emphasized
the importance of acknowledging the widespread use of the
telephone in conducting a Fourth Amendment analysis." According
to Marshall, a third-party intermediary capable of accessing
information can negate a reasonable expectation of privacy only
when the defendant exercises some choice in allowing the third party
to tap into his or her communications." Marshall argues that "unless
a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk
of surveillance .... It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts
where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic
alternative."79 Thus, according to Marshall's theory, the third-party
argument should not apply when a defendant relies on a mode of
communication and has no choice but to continue using that mode,
despite the existence of a third-party intermediary.
Courts should adopt Justice Marshall's reasoning and conclude
that information conveyed to third parties via the Internet should not
eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy when individuals have
no feasible choice but to reveal such information to a third party.
Similar to the telephone, the Internet is now a "personal [and]
professional necessity."8 In both personal and professional life, the
Internet plays a vital role in modern communication.8' As such, in
accordance with Justice Marshall's discussion, Smith's third-party
argument should not apply to internet activity because an individual
would need to forgo using what has become a virtual necessity in
modern society in order to evade the risk of surveillance. As the
Sixth Circuit noted in a recent decision, "[i]t goes without saying that
like the telephone earlier in our history, e-mail is an ever-increasing
mode of private communication, and protecting shared
communications through this medium is as important to Fourth
Amendment principles today as protecting telephone conversations
has been in the past." 2
77. 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 749.
79. Id. at 750.
80. Id.
81. See Foley, supra note 75, at 465 (discussing that "[c]ontent disclosure to Google or other
search engines is practically inevitable in order to participate in modem life").
82. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007).
1134
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Moreover, Smith's third-party argument is based, in part, on the
doctrine of assumption of risk.8 3  The theory holds that if an
individual shares information with a third party, that individual
assumes the risk that such data may be exposed to the government. 4
In cases of online browsing and electronic communications,
however, people intuitively presume such activity is private. Internet
users neither voluntarily provide information to third-party internet
service providers nor contemplate that their private endeavors will be
so exposed. In that sense, internet users cannot really assume a risk
of exposure when they are not conscious of such a risk. After all, as
one commentator has pointed out, the Internet "would be
fundamentally altered if every user's search was recorded, mapped to
an IP address, and delivered to the government." 5
c. The Presence of a Third-Party Intermediary
is Not a "Deal Breaker"
In any event, courts have found that individuals can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy even when a third party is
present.86 For instance, in Katz, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that an individual is "entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece [of a telephone] will not be broadcast to the world." 7
Although Katz involved protection of the actual content of the speech
in question, the Court acknowledged an expectation of privacy
notwithstanding the fact that the telecommunications carrier is a third
party that could potentially access such communication.88 It follows,
then, that the presence of a third party is not a "deal-breaker" with
regard to expectations of privacy; if it were, the Court in Katz would
have determined that the defendant did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his telephone conversations.
83. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749-50.
84. Id.
85. Foley, supra note 75, at 465.
86. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his telephone conversations when using a public telephone).
It is essential to note that in Katz, the Court does not specifically refer to the third-party
telecommunications carrier. Regardless, it is a given that the telecommunications carrier is an
always-present entity in telephone communications. The Court's failure to address the third-party
telecommunications carrier is evidence that a privacy analysis does not hinge on the presence of
such a carrier.
87. Id. at 352.
88. Id.
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Similarly, in Warshak v. United States,89 the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that individuals have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the content of e-mails sent or received through a
commercial internet service provider.9" Regardless of the fact that
the case involved e-mail content, the court reasoned that the presence
of an intermediary with the ability to access information does not
negate an expectation of privacy in online activity.9' The court
recognized that the third-party argument presents a potential slippery
slope since, if taken literally, "phone conversations would never be
protected, merely because the telephone company can access them;
letters would never be protected, by virtue of the Postal Service's
ability to access them; [and] the contents of shared safe deposit
boxes or storage lockers would never be protected, by virtue of the
bank or storage company's ability to access them."92 According to
the court, "the service provider's control over the files and ability to
access them under certain limited circumstances will not be enough
to overcome an expectation of privacy ....
d. Forrester is Unlike the "No Expectation of Privacy" Cases
Forrester is distinguishable from cases where courts have found
an individual has no expectation of privacy in electronic
communications. First, courts have found no expectation of privacy
in online activity when an individual intends to convey information
to the public.94 For example, in Guest v. Leis,95 the Sixth Circuit held
that individuals have no expectation of privacy in material posted on
89. 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007).
90. Id. at 473 (holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail
communications).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 470.
93. Id. at 473; see also United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 635 (2007) (recognizing that a university student had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his computer files, regardless of the fact that the student's computer was
logged onto the university's network); Curto v. Med. World Commc'ns, Inc., No.
03CV6327(DRH), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29387, at *24 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006) (noting that in
the context of attorney-client confidentiality, an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in e-mails and personal documents created and sent from his or her home but stored on a
company laptop because it was reasonable for the employee to believe such e-mails and
documents were confidential).
94. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001).
95. Id.
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electronic bulletin boards, reasoning that such information is
intended for public viewing.96 Likewise, in Warshak, the court
recognized the distinction between such public postings, where an
individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy, and e-mail
communications, where an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.97 The court explained that "public disclosure of material to
an untold number of readers distinguishes bulletin board postings
from e-mails, which typically have a limited, select number of
recipients."98
Second, courts have found that internet users have no
expectation of privacy when they are explicitly warned that their
online activity is subject to monitoring.99 For example, in United
States v. Simons,'00 the Fourth Circuit held that an employee lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic files on his office
computer because his employer had explicitly warned employees that
such files were routinely inspected. 1 ' Similarly, in United States v.
Angevine,0 2 the Tenth Circuit held that a university professor who
used a campus computer to download child pornography had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his internet activity because the
school had warned its employees that it regularly monitored activity
on the university's network."3
In Forrester, the defendant neither posted information on an
electronic bulletin nor received an explicit warning that his online
activity would be monitored. °4  Instead, the defendant merely
engaged in electronic communications and website browsing on his
personal computer in the privacy of his own home. °5 As such, the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his online
activity, which should not be negated by the existence of a third-
party internet service provider.
96. Id.
97. Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 472 (6th Cir. 2007).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).
100. Simons, 206 F.3d 392.
101. Id. at 398.
102. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130.
103. Id. at 1134-35.
104. 495 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007).
105. Id.
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2. Surveillance of IP Addresses Does Reveal Content
In Forrester, the Ninth Circuit erroneously determined that the
government's computer surveillance techniques are analogous to a
pen register in that neither reveals any content of the communication
involved."°6 Although the court's reasoning as applied to e-mail
addresses has merit, the court's analysis concerning IP addresses is
fundamentally flawed. Admittedly, e-mail addresses, like telephone
numbers, reveal the party with whom a particular communication
takes place, without revealing the substantive content of the actual
conversation. However, IP addresses can, in fact, disclose content.
The IP addresses of websites a person visits can reveal a great
deal of personal information, including the individual's interests and
how he or she surfs the web.0 7  According to Professor Ric
Simmons, in today's overwhelmingly technological world, "the rise
of the personal computer and the Internet has allowed individuals to
stay in the privacy of their own home to conduct many activities
which formerly had to be done in public."'0 8 As such, when people
browse the Internet, they may visit web pages to conduct business,
shop online, communicate with others, read articles, watch movies,
or carry out errands from home. Hence, while IP addresses merely
consist of a list of letters or numbers, they can, in fact, reveal a great
deal about a person, including "the names of stores at which a person
shops, the political organizations a person finds interesting, a
person's sexual fetishes and fantasies, her health concerns, and so
on."'0 9 IP addresses also reveal the topics an individual researches
and, in turn, may reveal a person's "interests, hobbies, or agendas,"
which he or she likely intended to remain private."' Accordingly,
such personal information disclosed by IP addresses is more akin to
106. Id. at 1049.
107. Posting of Daniel J. Solove to Concurring Opinions, http://concurringopinions.com/
archives/2007/07/thefourth amen.html (July 7, 2007, 11:35 EST).
108. Simmons, supra note 4, at 540. "An individual today can browse and shop online for
any item she might want, from clothing to cooking utensils to pornography; she can access and
download almost any kind of picture, political treatise, song, or book; she can even 'develop' her
own digital pictures, insert them into a pamphlet she is writing, and print multiple copies of the
pamphlet for distribution later. Only twenty years ago, almost any of these tasks would require
the average person to leave her home and personally visit any number of other businesses ... .
Id. (footnotes omitted).
109. Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1264, 1287 (2004).
110. Foley, supra note 75, at 447.
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the telephone communication at issue in Katz than to the mere
telephone numbers dialed in Smith."' Here, like in Katz, the
surveillance reveals actual content and, as a result, deserves Fourth
Amendment protection. I
B. The Court's Analogy to Physical Mail: Who Is the Mailman on
the Internet?
The Ninth Circuit erred in determining that computer
surveillance of e-mail addresses is "conceptually indistinguishable
from government surveillance of physical mail... 3  The court's
reasoning is tenuous; it assumes that the same privacy interests exist
between electronic mail and physical mail merely because both entail
an address visible to a third party."4 That is, in the case of electronic
mail, the address of the sender or recipient is visible to internet
service providers, and in the case of physical mail, the address
written on the outside of an envelope or package is visible to the
mailman." 5 The Ninth Circuit's reasoning is erroneous because there
is no mailman on the Internet.
In today's technological world, physical mail and electronic
mail are fundamentally different mediums. While a postal service
employee must inevitably see the address written on the outside of an
envelope in order to deliver the mail to the intended recipient, there
is no corresponding mailman for e-mail. In comparison to physical
mail, there is no tangible third party who reads e-mail addresses in
the realm of cyberspace; a mailman is a far more concrete entity than
an abstract internet service provider.
Moreover, the postal system is generally a public service, while
electronic mail is a private enterprise. When an individual sends a
letter or package through the postal service, he or she intuitively
knows that the envelope or box will be viewed by postal service
111. Id. at 470.
112. In United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1049 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007), the court
distinguishes an IP address from a URL. According to the court, "[a] URL, unlike an IP address,
identifies the particular document within a website that a person views and thus reveals much
more information about the person's Internet activity." Id. This argument is flawed. Even if an
IP address does not reveal the particular section of a website an individual visits, it discloses the
identity of the website, which reveals content in and of itself.
113. Id. at 1049.
114. Id. at 1049-50.
115. Id.
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employees working in the public system. However, when an
individual sends an e-mail, especially from a personal computer, he
or she anticipates that the only person viewing the sender's or
recipient's address is the party on the other end of the
communication." 6 As such, the Forrester court erred in holding that
the government's surveillance of e-mail addresses is analogous to
government surveillance of physical mail.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
In today's increasingly digital world, technological innovations
have armed the government with the capacity to probe into private
activities. For example, the government can monitor internet usage,
including electronic communications and online browsing. Now, as
opposed to before the advent of the Internet, individual privacy
interests are especially at risk."7
The Ninth's Circuit's decision in Forrester catalyzes a
narrowing of Fourth Amendment protections as applied to intemet
activity and modern surveillance methods. The gravamen of the
harm, it seems, is the application of Smith's third-party doctrine to
cyberspace. In applying Smith to the Internet, the Ninth Circuit
essentially precludes Fourth Amendment protection to any online
activity due to the presence of a third-party internet service provider.
Under Forrester, the mere existence of an internet service provider
would always negate an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy
and, in turn, prohibit a finding of a search in any case involving
surveillance of internet activity. Under this rubric, Fourth
Amendment protections will erode as applied to information
transmitted over the Internet.
A primary concern is that Forrester's narrowing of Fourth
Amendment protections creates a slippery slope. It is clear that e-
mail and IP addresses do not receive Fourth Amendment protection
from searches under Forrester. It is also clear that application of
116. Courts have recognized that individuals have a greater expectation of privacy in their
home than in the public sphere, as individuals enjoy the right "to retreat into [one's] own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (holding that the
use of a thermal-imaging device that detects the quantity of heat in one's home constitutes a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
117. See Homung, supra note 4, at 117-18.
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Smith's third-party doctrine to future computer surveillance cases
will enable courts to deny Fourth Amendment protections by merely
pointing to the existence of a third party, as the Ninth Circuit
demonstrated. What is unclear, however, is the extent of this power.
Where will courts draw the line? The answer to this query seems to
be that there is no limit on the government's ability to invoke the
third-party argument in internet cases. Without boundaries, internet
subscriber information, online chats, digital photographs, and the like
are all susceptible to surveillance under Forrester's analysis.
In addition, Smith's third-party doctrine is not viable in light of
modem technology because it will change how people use the
Internet. For many, the World Wide Web is a forum for private
conduct. Both online searches and electronic communications are
intended solely for private viewing, notwithstanding the presence of
an elusive internet service provider or a potential hacker. However,
the Smith court's rule would effectively require internet users to
anticipate that all of their online activity will be monitored by third
parties and subsequently inspected by the government. Further, most
people perceive online activity as an anonymous enterprise."8 This
sense of anonymity becomes threatened, however, when internet
users realize their actions can be constitutionally tracked."9 The
Internet will be radically different if any online activity is considered
fair game for government surveillance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Forrester, the Ninth Circuit was faced with the challenge of
determining the appropriate application of the Fourth Amendment in
the context of the Internet. The court held, as a matter of first
impression, that the use of computer surveillance techniques that
enable the government to learn the to/from addresses of one's e-mail
messages and the IP addresses of the websites one visits does not
constitute a Fourth Amendment search.' In reaching its decision,
the Ninth Circuit set the stage for an improper narrowing of the
118. See Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 288, 304-05 (2001) ("[A]nonymity is an essential tool in protecting free speech and
action on the Internet[.]").
119. See id. at 290.
120. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Fourth Amendment as applied to online searches and
communications.
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit erred in comparing less
technologically sophisticated devices, namely pen registers and
physical mail, to modem surveillance methods and internet activity.
First, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly analogized the government's use
of computer surveillance techniques to the use of a pen register. In
doing so, the court failed to recognize that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in both e-mail and IP addresses,
even though an internet service provider can access such
information. Second, the Ninth Circuit erroneously analogized
government surveillance of e-mail addresses to government
surveillance of physical mail. This comparison is problematic since,
unlike the public mail system, there is no tangible mailman in
cyberspace.
Instead of applying traditional rules to modern technology,
courts should set new standards for determining what constitutes a
search in the context of the Internet. As new technologies become
more prevalent and readily available, courts must focus on limiting
the government's ability to use those technologies to intrude into
private activities." Courts should recognize that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of e-mail
communications and in the IP addresses of websites they visit,
notwithstanding the presence of a third party. To hold otherwise
misconstrues the meaning of the Fourth Amendment as interpreted
by the Framers: to secure the people from unreasonable government
searches. Accordingly, "[t]he law must advance with technology to
ensure the continued vitality of the Fourth Amendment" '122 so as to
safeguard the privacy interests the Framers avidly sought to protect.
121. See Clancy, supra note 23, at 32.
122. Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 374, 384 n.7 (D. Del. 1997), af'd, 172 F.3d 861 (3d
Cir. 1998) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3557, 3559).
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